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The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Compared with the Law of 
Electronic Surveillance in Europe* 
By Ronald J. Sievert 
Introduction 
In the summer and fall of 2013 there were strong 
political, media, and public reactions to the 
disclosures of Edward Snowden regarding 
electronic surveillance conducted by the United 
States. These tended to create the impression of 
the U.S. government as ever present, snooping 
on every citizen’s private actions and 
conversations. 1 As the author has pointed out in 
previous articles, the reality is that the law and 
procedures regulating U.S. domestic 
surveillance are highly restrictive.2 In fact, 
notably absent from the furor surrounding the 
Snowden revelations were any verified claims of 
innocent citizens being harmed by U.S. 
surveillance. 
The purpose of this article is to compare the 
fundamental operative provisions of the U.S. 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
with the equivalent directives of European 
surveillance law in five representative countries. 
The specific provisions being compared relate to 
the ability to monitor the content of individual 
communications within the nation state or 
citizens outside territorial borders. The author is 
not greatly concerned at this point with the 
procedure required before interceptions of non- 
citizens outside the country as under U.S. law 
this is not limited in a manner that endangers the 
nation. Foreign residents outside the country are 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment and 
thus there are less obstructive regulations.3 Nor 
is there a need at this time to concentrate on 
metadata collection, which is simply the 
accumulation of data on numbers dialed, time, 
and duration of calls made by telephone 
subscribers. Metadata does not include content.4 
Although the provisions of the USA Freedom 
Act will increase the burden on the government 
by directing that this data be stored with the 
separate telecommunications providers instead 
of NSA,5 the threat posed by these provisions is 
minor compared to the dangers created by the 
restraints of the FISA statute on the ability of the 
government to intercept citizens and 
communications domestically.  
In this later area, an examination of European 
law will reveal that the authority provided to the 
Executive under less demanding standards than 
the U.S. and with reasonable oversight results in 
more efficient security procedures than the 
current U.S. regime while still fully complying 
with the strict guidelines established to protect 
privacy by the European Court of Human 
Rights.  
The author’s recent 2014 National Security Law 
Journal article on the creation of FISA contained 
a very brief review of European surveillance 
law.6 As the core of that article was an analysis 
of FISA, the section on European law was “bare 
bones” to say the least.  For the following 
analysis of current surveillance law in five major 
European countries, the author has had access to 
a number of important current studies. These 
include Winston Maxwell and Christopher 
Wolfe, A Global Reality: Government Access to 
Data in the Cloud,7 Francesca Galli, The Law on 
Terrorism: The U.K., France and Italy 
Compared,8 the Report of the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights on Intelligence 
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Surveillance,9 the UN Office of Drug Control 
Report on Electronic Surveillance in Member 
Nations,10 the ongoing work of the Library of 
Congress on Foreign Intelligence Gathering 
Laws,11 Simon McKay’s treatise on Covert 
Policing in the U.K,12 and other articles cited 
throughout. All were helpful, although none 
provided in whole exactly what was being 
sought in terms of how surveillance worked 
practically in comparison with U.S. Law. 
Somewhat more helpful have been actual 
personal and electronic interviews, aided by 
funding from the Scowcroft Institute of 
International Affairs, with key practitioners and 
scholars including, among others, Ms. Galli, Mr. 
McKay, German Professor of Intelligence Law 
Jan-Hendrik Dietrich, Judge Doctor Markus 
Loffelman, and Professor Doctor Reinhard 
Klaushofer.  
The first section of this article cites scholars, 
practitioners, and actual events to explain in 
detail exactly why the restrictive provisions of 
FISA endanger the security of the U.S. and why 
these rules are not required by the U.S. 
Constitution. It is the author’s belief that a much 
more reasonable approach is needed to obtain 
surveillance of content in cases involving al 
Qaeda, ISIS, or the threat of WMD.  The second 
section of this article will then review at length 
the comparable provisions guiding electronic 
surveillance of content in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain. The 
conclusion will highlight the important 
differences in the two systems and propose 
possible amendments for U.S. surveillance law. 
FISA  
In the United States, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) requires that the federal 
government prove to a designated federal judge 
“probable cause” that a US person or individual 
present in the US is “an agent of a foreign 
power” before conducting electronic 
surveillance to obtain the content of their 
communications.13 This is the highest criterion 
in U.S. search law, beyond such other legitimate 
standards as relevance, reasonable suspicion and 
articulable suspicion.14 The FISA statute was 
passed by the post-Watergate Congress in 1978, 
and based its provisions on the same probable 
cause standards that had been enacted in 1968 to 
justify interceptions in cases of ordinary crime.15 
However, as stated by numerous courts both 
before and after the enactment of FISA, the 
criminal law probable cause standard is not 
constitutionally required for searches conducted 
to obtain intelligence information in national 
security cases.16 Moreover, as will be explained 
following, the requirements of FISA have 
“created an unnecessarily protracted risk adverse 
process that is dominated by lawyers, not 
investigators and intelligence collectors”17 that 
has arguably already endangered the safety of 
U.S. citizens in numerous reported terrorist 
cases.18 
In the Supreme Court’s landmark case of Katz v. 
U.S. holding that probable cause warrants were 
required in ordinary crime cases, Justice White 
stressed that:  
There are circumstances in which it is 
reasonable to search without a warrant. 
In this connection, ….the Court points 
out that today's decision does not reach 
national security cases. Wiretapping to 
protect the security of the Nation has 
been authorized by successive 
Presidents. 19 
The Court followed four years later with U.S. v. 
U.S. District Court relating to the need for a 
warrant in investigating wholly domestic groups 
“composed of citizens of the U.S. which (have) 
no significant connection with a foreign power, 
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its agents or agencies,”20as opposed to “the 
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”21 
The Court then cited the American Bar 
Association’s standards on electronic 
surveillance supporting “the view 
that…warrantless surveillance may be 
constitutional where foreign powers are 
involved.” The Court’s emphasis that it was not 
imposing a constitutional requirement of 
probable cause warrants approved by 
magistrates in foreign intelligence cases only 
naturally followed from reference to preceding 
legal and factual history including that in 1940 
when President Roosevelt had authorized 
Attorney General Jackson to utilize wiretaps for 
national defense, Attorney General Tom Clark 
had advised President Truman of the necessity 
of such wiretaps,22 and Attorney General 
Brownell had sanctioned their employment by 
President Eisenhower.23 
In the years immediately following Keith, four 
separate federal circuit courts “readily accepted 
the existence of a foreign intelligence exception 
to the warrant requirement based on the legal 
and policy arguments put forth by the 
Executive.”24 Typical of the reasoning of these 
courts was the Third Circuit’s en banc opinion in 
U.S. v. Butenko: 
In the present case, too, a strong public 
interest exists: the efficient operation of 
the Executive's foreign policy-making 
apparatus depends on a continuous flow 
of information. A court should be wary 
of interfering with this flow….Also, 
foreign intelligence gathering is a 
clandestine and highly unstructured 
activity, and the need for electronic 
surveillance often cannot be anticipated 
in advance. Certainly occasions arise 
when officers, acting under the 
President's authority, are seeking foreign 
intelligence information, where exigent 
circumstances would excuse a warrant. 
To demand that such officers be so 
sensitive to the nuances of complex 
situations that they must interrupt their 
activities and rush to the nearest 
available magistrate to seek a warrant 
would seriously fetter the Executive in 
the performance of his foreign affairs 
duties.25 
Despite these cases, Congress, reflecting the 
distrust of the Executive in the Watergate era, 
passed FISA in 1978 imposing the same 
requirements of judicial approval and 
demonstration of probable cause on intelligence 
collection that it had ten years previously for 
ordinary crime. 26 This created the current 
bureaucratic risk-averse process that hinders 
intelligence collection.27 Jimmy Carter was also 
the first President not to strongly oppose such 
restrictions.28 
Although the Supreme Court has resisted efforts 
to define the phrase “probable cause” in terms of 
statistical percentage,29 it should come as no 
surprise that practitioners have come to focus on 
the word “probable” as meaning “more likely 
than not,” so that: 
For practical purposes probable cause 
exists when an officer has trustworthy 
information sufficient to make a 
reasonable person think it more likely 
than not that the proposed arrest or 
search is justified. In math terms this 
implies that the officer or magistrate is 
more than 50 percent certain that the 
suspect has committed the offense or 
that the items can be found in a 
particular place.30 
FBI Director James Comey has even stated that 
for FISA and T-III applications the government 
generally goes “beyond probable cause” to 
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establish and maintain credibility with the 
courts.31 It can take experienced lawyers more 
than a week to prepare the paperwork, and the 
documents “are like mortgage applications in 
their complexity.”32 
This FISA standard has created great difficulty 
in obtaining intelligence to defend the security 
of the United States. Terrorists and spies often 
operate in a loosely connected cell structure that 
can be hard to identify, they are well trained in 
avoiding detection, and their schemes can be 
quiet and nascent before suddenly erupting with 
devastating consequences. Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales defended the administration’s 
much criticized TSP warrantless surveillance 
program against al Qaeda suspects in the U.S. on 
the basis that the FBI needed more “speed and 
agility” in meeting the threat.33 NSA Director 
Michael Hayden amplified this comment in 
noting that the FISA probable cause standard 
was “too onerous.”34 Director of National 
Intelligence Mike McConnell testified about the 
number of man hours required to do the 
paperwork for a FISA and stated that “the 
current statutory requirement to obtain a court 
order based on probable cause slows, and in 
some cases prevents altogether, the 
Government’s efforts to conduct surveillance of 
communications it believes are significant to the 
national security.”35 In his opinion, this standard 
required “substantial expert resources towards 
preparing applications….(diverting them) from 
the job of analyzing collection results and 
finding new leads.”36 
Such comments are not new or confined to those 
attempting to defend executive branch actions. 
In 1982, Senator Malcom Wallop expressed the 
view that the “net effect of FISA has been to 
confuse intelligence gathering with criminal 
law” and that it is “nonsense” to attempt a 
formula for comprehensive surveillance of those 
who constitute a security threat.37 Gerald 
Reimers wrote that FISA’s “extraordinary 
procedures and high standards of proof result in 
unnecessary delay if not a bar” to intelligence 
investigations.38 Scholar Kim Taipale has 
written that when information comes from 
computers that do not reflect who placed the 
calls or their exact content, but legitimately 
focus the attention of government, it is almost 
impossible to establish probable cause in the 
FISA context.39 Federal Judge Richard Posner 
stated that FISA’s requirement of probable cause 
is no help “when the desperate need is to find 
out who is a terrorist.”40 Although strongly 
criticizing the expansion of FISA to include 
broad generic surveillance operations, noted 
professor William C. Banks recently 
acknowledged that in ongoing counterterrorism 
investigations where it might be impractical to 
seek a warrant “it is no longer realistic to argue 
that the Warrant Clause and its traditional law 
enforcement warrants and the criminal law 
version of probable cause should apply in the 
foreign intelligence context.”41 In the words of 
one Wall Street Journal commentator, “one 
would think that agents charged with protecting 
us from a ‘dirty nuke’ would enjoy the same 
discretionary search authority as a patrolman 
who makes a traffic stop. In fact, they have 
less.”42  
 As explained by numerous federal judges, the 
public claim that the FISA Court is somehow a 
rubber stamp because most applications are, in 
the end, approved, has no basis in fact and does 
not reflect the real difficulty of obtaining a 
FISA.43 In the opinion of Judge Richard Posner, 
the positive statistics are a reflection of the fact 
that the government is actually far too 
conservative in seeking surveillance orders.  He 
believes that in our legalistic culture the FBI 
tries to not only avoid violating the law but does 
not want to even sail close to the wind. “The 
analogy is to a person who has never missed a 
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plane in his life because he contrives always to 
arrive at the airport eight hours before the 
scheduled departure time.”44 
 A DOJ internal report prior to 9/11 strongly 
suggested that FISA greatly hindered the FBI in 
the Wen Ho Lee and Aldrich Ames espionage 
investigations involving the transfer of 
enormously damaging national security 
information to our potential enemies.45 Days 
before the 9/11 attacks the FBI had detained 
hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui in Minneapolis, but 
agents were prevented from scanning his 
computer because a supervisor at FBI 
Headquarters concluded there was not probable 
cause for a FISA warrant. Meanwhile, in the 
words of the DOJ Inspector General’s report, the 
Minneapolis office believed that “probable cause 
for the warrant was clear” and “became 
increasingly frustrated with the responses and 
guidance it was receiving.”46 The government 
apparently knew that 2007 Times Square 
bomber Faisal Shazad had “established 
interaction with the Pakistani Taliban, including 
bomb-making training in Waziristan” and had 
made “thirteen trips to Pakistan in seven years,” 
yet did not monitor him as he slowly assembled 
the materials to construct his potentially 
devastating weapon.47 This led the Wall Street 
Journal to question whether this failure was due 
to “restrictions imposed on wiretapping by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” and quote 
officials on the reduced effectiveness and 
excessive delays of the judicially regulated 
program.48 In a very extensive, detailed 
investigation of the Boston marathon bombing, 
Keith Maart further highlighted the constant 
confusion that is pervasive as reasonable people 
try to interpret FISA. He noted that, based on the 
facts that the Russian FSB had twice informed 
the FBI and CIA that Tamerlan Tsarnaev “had 
contacts with foreign Islamic militants/agents, 
was visiting jihadist websites, was looking to 
join jihadist groups” and had travelled to 
Dagestan on an unknown mission, it would 
certainly appear there was “sufficient probable 
cause to obtain FISA warrants that would 
allow…more encompassing surveillance.”  FBI 
lawyers had apparently come to a contrary 
conclusion.49 
Since 2001, the FISA Court of Review has again 
echoed the opinions of the Appellate Courts 
prior to the enactment of FISA by noting that 
probable cause is simply not required by the 
Constitution for the collection of foreign 
intelligence. The Fourth Amendment states that: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.50 
In the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “As the 
text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’”51 That 
is, although the Fourth Amendment states that 
warrants should be supported by probable cause, 
the ultimate test of the Constitutionality of a 
search is whether it is reasonable, not whether 
the government has established probable cause.  
Noted Constitutional Law scholar Reed Akhil 
Amar has written that those who seek to impose 
a “global probable cause requirement have yet to 
identify even a single early case, treatise, or state 
constitution that explicitly proclaims “probable 
cause” as the prerequisite for all “searches and 
seizures.”52Over the past 50 years the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly sanctioned searches 
without probable cause in “special 
circumstances” where significant safety and 
security concerns were present. These cases 
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involved, among others, regulation of the 
catering and liquor industry,53 firearms sales54 
and enforcement of city housing55 and 
occupational safety codes56 
The FISA Appellate Court of Review suggested 
the applicability of these cases when it approved 
FISA Patriot Act amendments in In Re Sealed 
Case.57 The court noted that the “threat to 
society…certainly remains a crucial factor” in 
determining whether a particular search is 
“reasonable” under the Constitution. It cited the 
Supreme Court’s approval of “warrantless and 
even suspicionless searches that are designed to 
serve the government’s special needs beyond the 
normal need of law enforcement.”58 The court 
further referenced the “president’s inherent 
constitutional authority to conduct warrantless 
foreign intelligence surveillance.”59 
In 2008, the FISA Court of Review clearly 
acknowledged the applicability of the above 
cited special needs cases in the domestic FISA 
context with its decision in In Re Directives 
Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.60 The case 
involved an appeal by the service provider of a 
FISA court finding that it was constitutional for 
the Attorney General to direct the interception of 
the communications of a U.S. person located 
outside the U.S. At the time, this was authorized 
without a FISA court order pursuant to the 
Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA).61 However, 
one year later Congress passed the FISA 
Amendments Act (FAA), 62 requiring a FISA 
Court order when surveillance was directed 
against U.S. persons even if they were located 
outside the US. Analyzing the previous PAA, 
the FISA review court expressly found what had 
been hinted at by In Re Sealed Case63; that is, 
there is a "foreign intelligence exception" to the 
probable cause judicial warrant requirement. In 
the FISA review court’s opinion,   
The (Supreme Court) has recognized a 
comparable exception, outside the 
foreign intelligence context, in so-called 
‘special needs’ cases. In those cases, the 
Court excused compliance with the 
Warrant Clause when the purpose 
behind the governmental action went 
beyond routine law enforcement and 
insisting upon a warrant would 
materially interfere with the 
accomplishment of that purpose.”64  
The FISA review court further found that "here 
the relevant government interest -- the 
government's interest in national security -- was 
of the highest order of magnitude."65 Individual 
privacy rights, on the other hand, were protected 
by executive branch findings, certifications and 
minimization requirements restricting the 
distribution of the information. The surveillance 
of U.S. persons without judicial warrant 
therefore met the key "reasonableness" test of 
the Fourth Amendment. It was only Congress, 
through FISA, and the FAA, that imposed 
greater restrictions.  
Electronic Surveillance in Europe 
Numerous legal commentators have written 
quite favorably about the European approach to 
privacy protection as opposed to what they 
consider more intrusive U.S. laws.66 In their 
opinion, “The U.S. Constitutional amendment 
protections (as applied) and U.S. federal and 
state laws fall short” of international standards.67 
The European convention with the enforcement 
mechanisms embodied by the European Court of 
Human Rights are considered to form the “most 
comprehensive and effective system for the 
protection of human rights in the world”68 As 
might be expected, in Europe there was loud and 
public (if disingenuous) fury over what some 
believed to be Edward Snowden’s “monstrous 
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allegations of total monitoring of various 
telecommunications and internet services.”69 
Yet, according to a study by the Max Planck 
Institute quoted by Stewart Baker, “you are 100 
times more likely to be surveilled by your own 
government if you live in the Netherlands or if 
you live in Italy…[and] 30 to 50 times more 
likely to be surveilled if you’re a French or 
German national then in the United States.” 70 
Relevant to this article is the fact that in national 
security matters, most of the major European 
powers, unlike the U.S., do not require either 
judicial approval or a standard close to 
probable cause before the government with 
general legislative oversight can conduct 
electronic surveillance to protect national 
security.71 Indeed, when a magistrate is involved 
in the process it is almost always an 
investigating magistrate as opposed to a neutral, 
non-participating judge in the mold of the 
American judiciary. The content of interceptions 
is often, but not always, admissible in court. 
All governmental surveillance in Europe must 
comply with Article 8 of the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights.72Article 8 provides that: 
Right to respect for private and family life. 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.73 
European States thus enjoy discretion in 
enacting surveillance provisions, but they must 
comply with Article 8 as interpreted by various 
cases of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Measures have to be in accordance with 
established law, have a legitimate aim, such as 
national security, safety and “economic well-
being,” be necessary in a democratic society, 
and be proportionate.  “Proportionate” refers to 
the fact that the invasion of privacy is justified 
by the need for the information.  As stated by 
Professor Francesca Galli, “A crucial factor for 
proportionality is the existence of sufficient 
safeguards to ensure that the measures are not 
carried out in an excessive or arbitrary manner 
… Surveillance techniques must represent the 
extrema ratio and only be permissible if the 
establishment of the facts by any other method is 
without prospects of success or considerably 
more difficult.”74 This is reflected in most 
European statutes and is mirrored in Title III of 
the U.S. Code on electronic surveillance 
requiring a statement as to why other 
investigative procedures “reasonably appear to 
be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous.”75 
The European Court further requires that 
surveillance law must be clear, predictable and 
meet a minimum set of safeguards, as 
summarized in the 1996 landmark case of Weber 
and Savaria v. Germany: 
[F]oreseeability in the special context of 
secret measures of surveillance, such as 
the interception of communications, 
cannot mean that an individual should 
be able to foresee when the authorities 
are likely to intercept his 
communications so that he can adapt his 
conduct accordingly […]. However, 
especially where a power vested in the 
executive is exercised in secret, the risks 
of arbitrariness are evident […]. It is 
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therefore essential to have clear, detailed 
rules on interception of telephone 
conversations, especially as the 
technology available for use is 
continually becoming more 
sophisticated […]. The domestic law 
must be sufficiently clear in its terms to 
give citizens an adequate indication as 
to the circumstances in which and the 
conditions on which public authorities 
are empowered to resort to any such 
measures […]. Moreover, since the 
implementation in practice of measures 
of secret surveillance of 
communications is not open to scrutiny 
by the individuals concerned or the 
public at large, it would be contrary to 
the rule of law for the legal discretion 
granted to the executive or to a judge to 
be expressed in terms of an unfettered 
power. Consequently, the law must 
indicate the scope of any such discretion 
conferred on the competent authorities 
and the manner of its exercise with 
sufficient clarity to give the individual 
adequate protection against arbitrary 
interference.76 
With regards to safeguards, the Court stated: 
In its case-law on secret measures of 
surveillance, the Court has developed 
the following minimum safeguards that 
should be set out in statute law to avoid 
abuses of power: the nature of the 
offences which may give rise to an 
interception order; a definition of the 
categories of people liable to have their 
telephones tapped; a limit on the 
duration of telephone tapping; the 
procedure to be followed for examining, 
using and storing the data obtained; the 
precautions to be taken when communi-
cating the data to other parties; and the 
circumstances in which recordings may 
or must be erased or the tapes 
destroyed.77  
With this introduction, the following explains 
the specific provisions for electronic 
surveillance in Germany, the U.K, France, Italy 
and Spain. 
Germany 
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
Germany provides that: 
1. The privacy of correspondence, 
posts, and telecommunications shall 
be inviolable. 
2. Restrictions (exemptions) may only 
be ordered pursuant to a law. If the 
restriction serves to protect the free 
democratic order or the existence or 
the security of the federation…the 
law may provide that the…recourse 
to the courts shall be replaced by a 
review of the case by bodies and 
auxiliary bodies appointed by 
parliament.78 
Germany, as most of the European governments 
that will be reviewed, attempts to maintain a 
“strict separation between the task of the police 
to fend off threats and to prosecute crimes on the 
one hand and the collection of information 
carried out by the intelligence services on the 
other.”79 In criminal cases involving listed 
crimes, surveillance for a lengthy period 
currently may only be authorized by an 
investigating judge after the police and 
prosecutor submit an application demonstrating 
reasons for the surveillance. If the law is not 
followed, a judge may exclude the evidence 
obtained.80 
In intelligence collection matters, applications 
must be made by the Federal or State Office for 
FISA of 1978 Compared with the Law of Electronic Surveillance in Europe 
9 
 
the Protection of the Constitution (OPC), the 
Military Counter Intelligence Service Office 
(CI), or the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) 
first to their respective ministries. This is 
generally the Ministry of the Interior for OPC, 
Defense for CI and direct to the responsible 
Chancellery officials for BND.81 These ministry 
departments were formerly coordinated by an 
executive branch Commissioner for Intelligence 
Services, which the Chancellor recently 
designated as the Secretary of State for 
Intelligence Service Issues.82 Applications must 
be in writing and demonstrate to the ministry 
and G-10 Commission that “concrete indications 
give rise to the suspicion that a person is 
planning, committing or has committed” 
significant listed crimes against state security.83 
They should also establish that “the use of 
another method to investigate the facts would be 
futile or render the investigation significantly 
more difficult,”84 and should not intrude upon a 
“core area of the private sphere.”85 
The relevant ministry may then issue an order 
for the interception which must be in writing 
“state the grounds for the order and the agency 
authorized to carry out the monitoring and the 
nature, scope and duration” of the interception.86 
Outside of emergency situations, however, the 
order must be approved by the G-10 commission 
before it can be executed.87 The commission, 
comprised of a chair person who is a legal 
expert, three associate chairpersons and four 
deputies, meets once a month to decide whether 
the interception is “permissible and necessary”88 
and meets the stated standards. It is the only 
expert body other than the ministry which 
reviews the interception before it is initiated. 
The G-10 commission is appointed by a 
Parliamentary Control Panel which appears to be 
a “mainstay of legislative control.”89 This body 
consists of nine members of parliament who also 
only meet once a month, but have the power to 
inspect all files of the intelligence services, visit 
facilities, and question staff members.90 They 
may issue reports to the legislature and “assess 
certain intelligence activities and publish such 
an assessment, provided this is in keeping with 
confidentiality regulations.”91 However, “their 
main task is to be a member of Parliament and 
not an inspector of intelligence services.”92 
As is the case of intelligence surveillance in 
most of the European nations examined, judicial 
review is not required for the Executive to 
initiate an interception. The European Court of 
Human Rights upheld this principle in the case 
of Klass v. Germany. The court held that judicial 
consent was not necessary and that other 
safeguards were sufficient, as long as these were 
independent and vested with powers to exercise 
effective and continuous control.93 
This does not mean that the courts never have an 
opportunity to review surveillance.  The data 
may be transferred to the prosecutor where 
“concrete indications give rise to the suspicion 
of planned or completed offenses and this 
evidence may be used in court.94 The ability to 
utilize the information in court, subject to 
protection of sources and methods, is the norm 
in the countries examined, with the exception of 
the UK. In addition, although targets of 
surveillance are of course not notified at the time 
of the interception, they must be informed as 
quickly as possible once disclosure no longer 
impedes the fulfillment of the government’s 
mission, leading to the possibility that the targets 
may seek recourse in the German courts. 
Germany does not require that the procedures 
listed above be followed for security 
surveillance conducted outside the country. This 
is consistent with the U.S. principle announced 
in U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez to the effect that 
our Constitution does not apply to non-citizens 
overseas.95 However, several German jurists 
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have presented arguments to Parliament 
suggesting that failure to comply with the above 
list of domestic procedures even when 
conducting surveillance in a foreign nation 
would be a violation of their basic law or 
Constitution.96 As of the date of this writing, this 
matter was a subject of intense debate, but the 
German law had not changed.97 
United Kingdom 
The U.K, like other European countries, long 
had an unstructured system of electronic 
surveillance which was eventually castigated by 
the European Court of Human Rights.98 The 
result was the 2000 passage of the Regulatory of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA).99 As stated by 
Simon McKay in his book, Covert Policing, 
RIPA is a landmark piece of legislation 
regulating surveillance for the first time in the 
UK and including specific provisions for the 
interception of communications on private 
communications systems. In addition, Codes of 
Practice are regularly issued to guide 
surveillance and electronic interception 
activities.100 In 2010, the European Court of 
Human Rights found that RIPA was in 
compliance with Article 8 privacy requirements 
with its holding in Kennedy v. United 
Kingdom.101 Pursuant to RIPA, as is the case 
with other European nations, the judiciary is not 
generally involved in security surveillance. 
However, unlike many other nations, in the UK 
it is a general rule the product of that 
surveillance cannot be used in court.102 
Section 5 of RIPA provides that the relevant 
Secretary of State (often the Home Secretary in 
domestic matters) can issue an intercept warrant 
if he believes it would be “necessary in the 
interests of national security, for the purpose of 
preventing or detecting serious crime, for the 
purpose of safeguarding the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom, or for the purpose 
of giving effect to the provisions of international 
mutual assistance agreements.”103 The standard, 
as set forth in RIPA and the Code of Practice, is 
that the Secretary of State must determine 
whether the interception is necessary, whether 
the information can be reasonably obtained by 
other means, and whether the interception 
requested is proportionate to what is sought to 
be achieved. That latter concept has been 
explained above by the ECtHR.104 
There are only a limited number of persons 
authorized to apply to the Secretary for a 
warrant, and these include the Director General 
of the Security Service (MI 5), the Chief of the 
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and Chief 
Constables.105 The application, and subsequently 
the warrant, will detail the operational 
background, a description of the targeted person 
or premises, and the types of communications 
that are likely to be intercepted.106 
The content of the interceptions must be 
destroyed once they are no longer needed for the 
authorized purposes.107 As defined, the phrase 
“authorized purposes” does not include use by 
the prosecutor as evidence in trial or review by a 
criminal defense attorney. 108 McKay 
acknowledges that “it is this latest provision that 
is the most problematic and where tensions have 
arisen.”109 In the words of Francesca Galli, “the 
intelligence services and many sections of the 
police are particularly keen to prevent disclosure 
of any intercept evidence to the public on the 
grounds that it would spoil the efficacy of this 
investigative technique by alerting suspects of 
their sources, methods and interception 
capabilities, which allow them to prevent and 
disrupt terrorist outrages and serious crimes.”110 
She notes, however, that some suggest these 
security concerns really mask the unwillingness 
of the Secretary of State and law enforcement to 
have the lawfulness and proportionality of 
intercepts scrutinized by the courts.111 
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Apparently there have been “eight reports in the 
last thirteen years to government ministries on 
this issue.” 112 Many of these reports, as well as 
government officials, have come out in favor of 
the admissibility of intercept evidence in 
criminal trials.113 
However, section 18 of RIPA does provide for 
the disclosure of intercept material to the 
prosecutor so that he can decide whether a 
prosecution should continue consistent with the 
duty to see that justice is done in a fair manner. 
It may also be given to a judge “in the interests 
of justice” or to determine whether certain facts 
should be admitted at trial.114 There are also 
exceptions permitting disclosure for proceedings 
involving a violation of the Act itself, before the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal or the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission.115 
Parliamentary control is theoretically provided 
through the Intelligence and Security Committee 
which is charged with overseeing the 
expenditure, administration, policy and 
operations of the security and intelligence 
services. However, this committee cannot 
review particular operations or ongoing matters 
unless requested by the Prime Minister or a 
government department.116 Scrutiny of the 
functions of the intelligence services is instead 
provided by a number of executive bodies 
including the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner (ICC), the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner (ISC), the Chief Surveillance 
Commissioner CSC) and the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT). 117 
Determining the exact roles of these officers, 
and where they overlap, is sometimes difficult 
based on a simple reading of their duties. In 
essence, the ICC is an individual qualified as a 
high judicial official who does not perform a 
judicial function but rather is responsible to 
“keep under review” the performance of the 
Secretary of State with respect to acquisition and 
disclosure of intercepted material. He cannot 
order that a warrant be quashed or content be 
destroyed, but he may report to the Prime 
Minister or IPT.118 The ISC must “keep under 
review the carrying out of any functions of the 
intelligence services, a head of an intelligence 
service, or any part of Her Majesty’s Forces, or 
the Ministry of Defense, so far as engaging in 
intelligence activity.”119 In all other respects, 
“the functions and duties of the ISC are in the 
same terms as those relating to the ICC.”120 The 
Chief Surveillance Commissioner must actually 
approve all warrants to enter property used as a 
dwelling, hotel bedroom or office. 121 The Chief 
shall also keep under review the performance of 
personnel conducting surveillance activities 
“insofar as they are not required to be kept under 
review by the ICC and ISC.”122 Finally, the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) has fairly 
broad jurisdiction to investigate complaints 
against powers granted under RIPA. It has the 
power to investigate any alleged violation of 
human rights that may have occurred under 
RIPA and whether any conduct was justified and 
proportional.123 The hypothetical power of the 
IPT is offset by the fact that the absence of 
disclosure of surveillance activities “means that 
the majority of interferences with privacy will be 
undetected.”124 Disclosing the existence of a 
warrant would be an offense under section 17 of 
RIPA, although it is always possible that 
violations may become public pursuant to the 
disclosure exceptions noted above. 
As of this writing there is a proposal pending in 
Parliament to create a body of separate judicial 
commissioners under an Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner to review surveillance 
applications. 125This new system, however, 
would not approximate the independent judicial 
review that those in the civil liberties community 
have been demanding. The Commissioners 
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would apparently be charged with simply 
ensuring proper procedures were followed 
instead of reviewing the evidence de novo. In 
addition, they would be appointed by the 
government only, without vetting by the 
Parliament or judiciary, and they could be 
removed after three years.126 The overall power 
to intercept electronic communications would 
thus apparently still rest firmly in the hands of 
the Executive branch with quite limited 
oversight. 
France 
The French Code of Domestic Security provides 
that “the secrecy of correspondence emitted via 
electronic communications is guaranteed by 
law,”127 but that there may be exceptions for 
national security or essential elements of the 
scientific and economic potential of France.128 
Prior to 1991, the French electronic surveillance 
regime was essentially built upon case law and 
ad hoc procedures without a solid statutory 
framework.129 As might be expected, the 
European Court of Human Rights found that this 
practice did not comply with Article 8’s 
requirement that interference with private 
communications be grounded upon established 
legal provisions.130 In response, France passed in 
1991 its foundational law 646/91 on the Secrecy 
of Communications Issued by the 
Telecommunications Channel.131 This was 
followed by a series of amendments relating to 
interceptions in criminal cases,132 counter 
terrorism, and national security matters.133 The 
ECHR has found the practice established by 
these statutes to be in compliance with Article 
8.134 
Pursuant to the statutory framework of 646/91, 
the French Code of Criminal Procedure 
incorporated detailed provisions specifying 
when courts and prosecutors could intercept 
conversations.135 A Juge d’instruction is a judge 
of inquiry who is tasked with determining 
whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed to 
a criminal trial, generally with reference to 
completed crimes. This judge may order an 
interception as part of his general evidence-
gathering powers. However, this type of 
interception is not necessarily routine, as one of 
the key principles of 646/91 applying to all 
French wiretaps is that they should only be 
initiated in extrema ratio or where other 
investigative methods would be unsuccessful or 
unavailable.136 This basic language is very 
similar to that quoted above as required by the 
ECtHR. 
The French Government recognized it needed 
some active method of interception for ongoing 
crimes (in flagrante) and in 2004 passed law 
204/2004 noting that in a limited number of 
listed serious crimes, such as those committed as 
part of organized crime, a juge des liberties et de 
la detention, or judge of liberty and detention, 
could order a wiretap upon application of a 
prosecutor. The standard would be the same as 
above. Apparently the police and prosecutor can 
begin the surveillance and send the application 
to the court to obtain permission 
retrospectively.137 
All the evidence obtained in these interceptions 
is admissible in court. 138 This is consistent with 
other European jurisdictions but contrary to 
English law. 139 It should be noted that, with 
respect to the retrospective approvals requested 
from the judges of liberty and detention, it 
would be expected that an application that did 
not meet required standards would probably 
result in the suppression of the evidence. Thus, 
there is certainly motivation for the police and 
prosecutors to submit an application that 
complies with the law even if they start 
surveillance before obtaining judicial consent. 
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In national security cases which can include the 
protection of French scientific and economic 
resources, prevention of organized crime and 
terrorism, Law 646/91 Articles 3-19 permit the 
prime minister, upon application of the Defense, 
Customs or Interior Ministers, to order an 
interception without permission from the 
courts.140 This practice has been continued with 
the 2012 decree of a Code de la Securite 
Interiure, or Code of Homeland Security, 
designed as a compilation of the pertinent 
sections of French national security law.141 The 
standard is a “written and reasoned warrant 
“upon “a written and reasoned application.”142 
The only timely review is conducted by the 
Commission nationals de controls des 
interceptions securite (CNCIS),143 recently 
renamed the National Commission for Control 
of Intelligence Techniques (CNCTR).144 The 
CNCTR is composed of nine members: two 
representatives of the National Assembly, two 
Senators, two members of the Council of State, 
two judges of the Court of Cassation, and one 
associate with skills in electronic 
communication. The Commission assesses 
whether prescribed procedures are followed, and 
whether these respect the right to privacy and 
the principle of proportionality. Should the 
CNCTR consider a surveillance measure to be 
carried out unlawfully, it can recommend to the 
prime minister, the relevant minister and the 
intelligence service that the surveillance be 
interrupted and the collected data destroyed. The 
prime minister must immediately inform the 
CNCTR about how the recommendation was 
followed, but recommendations are not 
automatically enforced.145 Negative 
recommendations appear to be rare.146 Among 
its other duties, this body ensures that recording 
and duration procedures are followed. It can also 
review cases filed by individuals claiming a 
violation of statutory provisions.147 
The contents of security interceptions, being 
preventive in nature, are supposed to be erased 
at the end of the operation.148 Accordingly, the 
content is not normally admissible in a criminal 
trial. However, where major criminality is 
discovered, the government can hand “the file” 
over to the criminal prosecutor, who then may 
initiate one of the previous mentioned judicial 
interceptions.149 It is unclear how much of the 
contents of the security interception is contained 
in the file that is submitted to the courts to 
initiate a follow up judicial interception. 
A review of the surveillance procedures in the 
major European nations, as indicated above in 
France, reveals that the executive branch makes 
the relevant operational decisions with little 
direct interference from the judiciary or 
legislature. However, some degree of at least 
general oversight is occasionally provided by 
parliamentary committees or expert bodies.150 In 
France, legislative oversight is accomplished 
through the parliamentary intelligence 
delegation (délégation parlementaire au 
renseignement, DPR). This body examines and 
assesses governmental policy in the area of 
intelligence but does not oversee the services 
directly. It does not have access to information 
about ongoing operations carried out by the 
services or surveillance methods or information 
regarding exchanges with foreign services. 151 
The DPR may conduct hearings and request 
reports, and can make recommendations to the 
president of the republic and the prime minister. 
Requests for classified documents from 
parliamentary committees tend to be rejected, 
and members of parliament have no right to hear 
or question members of the intelligence 
services.152 
There are ongoing criticisms by the civil 
liberties community of the French system. One 
related the lack of judges on the CNCIS,153 but 
this was remedied to an extent with the inclusion 
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of two judges on the CNCTR. Still, the CNCTR 
can only make non-binding recommendations. 
Other complaints target the broad definition of 
national security and the fact that there is no 
statutory maximum number of renewals for 
security interceptions.154 As of this writing there 
have been no changes in these areas. 
Italy 
In Italy, Article 266 et seq of the Codice di 
Procedura Penale, or Code of Criminal 
Procedure, allows a prosecutor to apply to a 
judge for an interception warrant when 
investigating the commission of an offense that 
has already taken place.155 The offense must be a 
serious offense involving a penalty greater than 
five years such as the use of drugs, firearms or 
explosives.156 The judge will approve the 
interception based on “a reasoned decision 
where there are serious grounds for believing 
that a crime has been committed and it is 
absolutely indispensable for the purposes of the 
investigation.”157 The judge clearly must be 
provided enough evidence to support a 
“reasoned decision,” but apparently he does not 
get access to the full file. 158 
In organized crime, human trafficking and 
terrorism cases, where there is an established 
investigation, the judge may authorize an 
interception with somewhat less stringent 
standards. Specifically, there need only be 
“sufficient grounds” as opposed to “serious 
grounds,” and the interception need only be 
“necessary” instead of “indispensable.”159 The 
results of the interception may also be used to 
expand into other investigative areas. 
The contents of both these types of interception 
are admissible in court. However, if proper 
procedures are not followed, the contents may 
be suppressed.160 If the content reveals state 
secrets, the government or the court may decide 
to withhold the content.161 This is similar to the 
practice with the Classified Information 
Procedures Act in The US.162 
These interceptions apply to established 
investigations of crimes already committed. 
From a standpoint of security, there are 
procedures for preventive interceptions in 
organized crime and terrorism cases contained in 
Article 5 of 438/2001.163 The courts are not 
involved in these interceptions. Rather the 
Minister of the Interior164 or the Agenzia 
Informazioni e Sicurrezza Esterna (AISE) or 
internal (AISI) acting under the Prime Minister 
may apply for an interception warrant. A 
warrant will be issued by the prosecutor if, based 
on the evidence shown, it is “deemed to be 
necessary to prevent terrorist activities or 
subversion of the constitutional order,”165 to 
“protect the independence, integrity and security 
of the Republic . . . against threats originating 
abroad,” or to preserve “Italy's political, 
military, economic, scientific, industrial 
interests.”166 This information cannot be used as 
evidence in criminal trial.167 However, when a 
criminal violation becomes manifest, the file 
may be transferred to a public prosecutor who 
may then apply to the court to start a subsequent 
criminal investigation.168 
In Italy there are no expert bodies like the 
CNCTR that review government electronic 
surveillance, although a Garante or Data 
Protection Authority has been established to 
“protect fundamental rights and freedoms in 
connection with the processing of personal 
data.” 169 Parliamentary oversight is provided by 
the Committee for the Security of the Republic 
(COPASIR).170 The Intelligence services are 
supposed to report the requests that have been 
made for wiretapping to the committee, and the 
committee members may inspect the various 
organizations that make up the Intelligence 
Community. COPASIR may order the 
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government to conduct internal investigations if 
it suspects illegal action. 
There have been a number of complaints in Italy 
about the press obtaining the contents of 
intercepted communications even before the 
conclusion of a preliminary investigation. There 
has also been a proposal to change the standard 
for criminal interceptions from “reasoned 
decision” to “evident suspicions of guilt,” but 
apparently this was abandoned by the 
government in 2011.171  
Spain 
Article 18.3 of the Spanish Constitution 
provides that communications, particularly 
postal, telegraphic and telephone 
communications shall be confidential unless a 
court decides otherwise.172 Article 579 of the 
Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure provided 
that a Judge can issue a warrant if there is 
evidence that facts and circumstances material to 
a case could be uncovered. This was also used 
previously by the intelligence services.173 The 
European Court of Human Rights found these 
procedures to lack of clarity and foreseeability. 
174The Spanish Constitutional Court has since 
established rules that appear to comply with the 
ECtHR, especially with respect to new 
procedures  requiring “sufficient justification to 
restrict the fundamental right of 
communication,” and respect to proportionality 
so that a judge may cease interceptions when it 
is no longer necessary to interfere with an 
individual’s rights.175 The standard appears to be 
“evidence that a relevant issue or circumstance 
of the case may be discovered.”176 
There was no clear legal framework regulating 
the surveillance activities of the Spanish 
Intelligence Services prior to 2002.177 In 2002, 
the Parliament passed the National Intelligence 
Center Act,178 designating the Center as the 
agency in charge of collecting and analyzing 
information to “promote the political, economic, 
industrial, commercial and strategic interests of 
Spain.”179 This includes avoiding threats and 
attacks on the independence of the state, its 
territory and the rule of law.180 To achieve these 
goals, the Center was empowered to “collect and 
interpret signals intelligence.”181 The NIC is 
supervised by a Secretary of State-Director of 
the National Intelligence Center who reports to a 
Government Delegate Commission for 
Intelligence Affairs under the authority of the 
Prime Minister. The legislature has a standing 
committee on Intelligence Affairs or Official 
Secrets Committee that monitors intelligence 
spending182 and is to receive “appropriate 
information about the functioning and activities 
of the NIC.”183 At the same time as the NIC was 
created, Parliament also passed the Act on 
Judicial Oversight of the National Intelligence 
Center.184 
The Judicial Oversight Act provides that before 
an interception can be initiated in an intelligence 
case the office of the Secretary of State-Director 
of Intelligence must apply to a judge for a 
warrant.185 The Judge is a member of the 
Supreme Court appointed for a five year term 
and his decisions must remain secret.186 The 
government’s application must state the nature 
of the investigation, the reasons for an 
interception, who would be affected, and the 
likely duration and locations of electronic 
surveillance.187 In accordance with the prior 
cited case law, the standards would presumably 
be “sufficient justification” and 
“proportionality,” although the Judicial 
Oversight Act does not provide that the judge 
actually supervise the monitoring of 
communication. The Act also does not contain 
provisions for notifying targeted parties even 
when notification would no longer interfere with 
the investigation. 
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In addition, In cases of urgency, when 
investigations are carried out to uncover felonies 
related to the acts of armed gangs, terrorist 
elements or rebels, the interception of 
communications may be ordered by the Minister 
of Home Affairs, or otherwise, the Director of 
State Security. They must communicate this 
order immediately by a “reasoned opinion” in 
writing to the relevant judge, who will also by a 
reasoned opinion, revoke or confirm such 
resolution in a maximum term of 72 hours.188 If 
Parliament declares a “state of alarm, emergency 
or siege” that is implemented by decree of the 
cabinet, Article 18.3 of the Spanish Constitution 
may be suspended and the government may 
intercept any kind of communications, provided 
that the interception is “necessary to clarify 
alleged criminal offenses or to maintain public 
order.”189 
Conclusion 
There are two major points of difference that 
emerge when contrasting the cited European 
surveillance law with FISA. First is the fact that, 
with the exception of Spain, the judiciary is not 
involved in decisions on intelligence collection. 
Second is that none of the countries listed hold 
the government to as high a standard as probable 
cause before surveillance to protect the country 
may be authorized. 
There have been numerous proposals to insert 
the judiciary into the intelligence collection 
process in Europe, but to date, these have not 
been adopted.190 Objections relate to the highly 
technical and nuanced nature of intelligence 
matters which is beyond the scope of most 
judges.191 Chief Burger made similar comments 
in CIA v. Sims,192 noting that judges have “little 
or no background in the delicate business of 
intelligence gathering”193 and that “what may 
seem trivial to the uninformed may appear of 
great moment to one who has a broad view of 
the scene and who may put…information in its 
proper context.”194 The British Home Secretary 
has responded to Civil Liberties organizations 
that interceptions of communications and such 
intrusions of privacy should be authorized by the 
Executive as someone who is accountable by 
election directly to the British people and who 
has a greater understanding of the wider 
context.195As previously indicated, in the 
landmark case 1978 case of Klass v. Germany, 
the European Court of Human Rights found that 
“the exclusion of judicial control does not 
exceed the limits of what may be deemed 
necessary in a democratic society.”196 
Of course, in criminal matters, most of the 
European nations do involve the prosecutor and 
a judge. This judge, however, is often an 
investigating judge whose duties are closely 
associated with a U.S. prosecutor investigating a 
case while adhering to his professional 
commitment to see that justice is done. They are 
not the same as U.S. trial and appellate judges. 
Still, a neutral judge is different than a 
government minister or the police. In that 
context, it is interesting to note that the 
European system did not set up the wall between 
law enforcement and intelligence that was 
established in the U.S. on the unsound basis that 
there were slight differences between Title III 
criminal interception and FISA intelligence 
interception.197 With the exception of the U.K., 
the European nations had established procedures 
to share the intelligence take with law 
enforcement and to admit the evidence, 
sometimes redacted, in criminal court. This only 
makes sense as terrorism, espionage, sabotage 
and other crimes are at the same time subjects of 
intelligence collection and criminal prosecution. 
Regardless, judicial approval in the U.S. may 
not be the major problem faced by the 
government, because by establishing a FISA 
Court we have ensured that the judges reviewing 
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intelligence applications will over time have at 
least some understanding of intelligence matters. 
The greater concern is the burdensome standard 
that must be met before surveillance can be 
legally authorized in the U.S. Both Europe and 
the U.S. require extrema ratio, or evidence that 
other methods are unlikely to succeed or are 
dangerous. But the U.S. in addition demands an 
evidentiary affidavit showing to the judge 
demonstrating probable cause, or that it is “more 
likely than not” that a target is an agent of a 
foreign power before the government can legally 
proceed. A close review of the European law 
quoted verbatim above finds nothing close to 
such a high standard. The phrases used in the 
European statutes and court cases are “concrete 
indications giving rise to suspicion,” 
”permissible and necessary,” 
(Germany)”necessary and proportionate” (U.K.), 
“written and reasoned warrant,” 
(France),”reasoned decision,” “sufficient 
grounds,” (Italy) “sufficient justification” and 
“evidence that material facts may be discovered” 
(Spain).  All suggest that the government cannot 
conduct surveillance without good reason, but 
none of these imply that the government must 
wait to get enough evidence to be able to 
demonstrate to a court anything that could be 
interpreted as it being “more likely than not” 
that a target is an agent of a foreign power at the 
time surveillance is initiated. None creates, as 
does FISA, “an unnecessarily protracted risk-
averse process that is dominated by lawyers, not 
investigators and intelligence collectors”198 that 
has arguably already endangered the safety of 
U.S. citizens in numerous reported terrorist 
cases.199 The cited European law is “designed to 
be preventative in nature,” discovering plots in 
the planning stages before it may be too late to 
thwart an attack.200 Yet all of these laws still 
comply with “the most comprehensive and 
effective system for the protection of human 
rights in the world” as enforced by the European 
Court of Human Rights.201 
As explained earlier in this article, the 
provisions of FISA are not mandated by the 
Constitution. They are also not required to 
reasonably protect privacy and human rights as 
reflected in decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The statute is an unnecessary 
obstacle placed upon the government by the 
1978 Congress before the advent of al Qaeda 
and ISIS. In matters involving members of those 
organizations, who are by any definition at war 
with the U.S., or cases involving a potential 
WMD, Congress should lower the standard for 
surveillance in line with the standards followed 
by our European allies. 
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